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THE RACIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE “2.3 
OR TAKE A KNEE” LEGISLATION   
AKUOMA C. NWADIKE,* ASHLEY R. BAKER,** VELINA B. BRACKEBUSCH,*** 
& BILLY J. HAWKINS**** 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Academic reform has been an ongoing effort by the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA) since its inception. One of the recurring  
challenges it has faced has been the setting of employable and achievable  
academic standards for all athletes seeking to compete at one of its member 
institutions, whether at the Division I, II, or III level. The primary goals have 
been to establish academic standards and to inform and reaffirm the NCAA’s 
commitment to academic excellence. Also of concern with setting these  
academic standards is the need to quiet the critics who question whether  
athletes are academically prepared to enter these institutions and thus, receive a 
quality education—especially at the Division I Football Bowl Subdivision 
(FBS) level. There have been several efforts to establish academic standards 
that preceded the current “2.3 or Take a Knee” policy.1 
Historically, the NCAA has implemented many reforms to reaffirm its  
commitment to education including the following:  
 
 A 1.600 rule for initial academic eligibility in 1965;2 
 The abolition of the 1.600 legislation in 1973;3 
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1.2.3 or Take a Knee, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/static/2point3/ (last visited June 9, 2016).  
“2.3 or Take a Knee” is the colloquial phrase used to summarize the new Division I initial eligibility 
requirements for perspective student-athletes. 
2. JOSEPH N. CROWLEY, IN THE ARENA: THE NCAA’S FIRST CENTURY 87 (2006). 
3. Id. at 96. 
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 The reorganization of the NCAA into three divisions in 
1973;4 
 In 1983, Proposition 48 required prospective  
student-athletes to reach specified grade-point  
averages and standardized test scores;5 
 In 1989, Proposition 42 withheld athletically-related 
aid from partial academic qualifiers;6 
 The rescinding of Proposition 42 in 1990;7 
 In 1992, Proposition 16 established an  
initial-eligibility index based on standardized test 
scores and grade-point averages;8 
 In 2003, the number of core courses increased from 
thirteen to fourteen, the partial qualifier was  
abolished, and the minimum standardized test score  
requirement was deleted;9  
 Finally in 2005, the Academic Progress Rate (APR) 
subjected teams that fail to meet established minimum 
scores to possible penalties ranging from loss of  
scholarships to postseason bans and membership  
restrictions.10 
 
These are some of the major efforts that have been implemented by the 
NCAA to increase academic standards among athletes and potentially ensure 
success in their academic careers from matriculation to graduation. 
With the increased migration of black athletes from Historically Black  
Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) to Historically White Colleges and  
Universities (HWCUs) during the late 1970s and early 1980s, academic  
standards employed during and since that time have specifically had an  
adverse impact on the enrollment of black male athletes participating in the  
                                               
4. Id. at 117. 
5. Id. at 161. 
6. Id. at 184. 
7. Id. at 189. 
8. Id. at 192. 
9. Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC, NCAA Division I Strengthens Academic Eligibility Standards, 
COLLEGIATE SPORTS GRP. NEWSLETTER 1–2 (Oct. 2002), http://www.bsk.com/site/files/10-2002% 
20NL%20Collegiate%20Sports.pdf. 
10. CROWLEY, supra note 2, at 228. 
HAWKINS ET AL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2016  5:33 PM 
2016]      INSTITUTIONAL RACISM IN THE NCAA  525 
revenue-generating sports of men’s basketball and football.11 For the  
upcoming implementation of the new initial-eligibility standard, referred to as 
2.3 or Take a Knee,12 the NCAA must consider the policy’s potential for  
reigniting and reaffirming institutional racist practices in the organization’s  
attempts to combat academic criticism. A review of its history exposes how 
many of its choices, while supposedly appeasing opponents of the  
organization’s alleged commitment to athletics over academics, result in the  
disproportionate alienation of African-Americans from higher education  
opportunities. Thus, the potential impact of this new policy calls into question 
the NCAA’s racial integrity towards the population that makes up the largest 
percentage of revenue-generating sports. To prevent institutional racist  
practices, the NCAA should work with its members to provide equitable  
eligibility opportunities for all student-athletes, but particularly for the  
African-American students participating in men’s basketball and football, who 
have historically been affected the most, and if implications hold true, will see 
their potential to contribute to college athletics drop steeply by the fall  
semester of 2016. 
II.  A NEW NCAA DIVISION I ELIGIBILITY STANDARD 
 For the 2016 incoming class of student-athletes, NCAA initial  
eligibility standards have once again tightened. A freshman athlete must enter 
with a minimum 2.3 high school core GPA and a corresponding standardized 
test score of 900 on the math and reading sections of the SAT, or a 75  
combined score on the English, math, science, and reading sections of the ACT, 
to be immediately eligible for competition; the previous standard, which  
required a minimum core GPA of 2.0 and a 1010 on the SAT (or 86 on the 
ACT), will result in an academic redshirt year,13 allowing the student-athlete to 
receive athletic aid and practice with the team during the first academic term.14 
                                               
11. See generally id.  Though college athletics as a whole has grown in popularity, only Division I 
basketball and football continuously generate revenue in the multimillion-dollar range.  The bulk of the 
revenue comes from schools participating in five FBS conferences: SEC, ACC, Pac-12, Big Ten, and 
Big 12.  Though universities outside of these conferences generate massive revenue as well,  
specifically the football and basketball teams in the AAC and the basketball teams in the Big East 
Conference, the majority of the revenue sports teams in these conferences are populated by  
African-American athletes, many admitted through special admissions. 
12. 2.3 or Take a Knee, supra note 1.  
13. See Test Scores, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/test-scores (last  
visited June 9, 2016). 
14. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, New Eligibility Standards Start in 2016, NCAA.COM, 
http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2012-04-26/new-eligibility-standards-start-2016 (last updated 
Apr. 26, 2012) (providing a detailed account of the new academic requirements for prospective  
college student-athletes seeking admission beginning in Fall 2016).  A 2.0 GPA in core courses will 
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A student-athlete on probation can earn additional practice time for the next 
term by passing nine semester hours, or eight quarter hours.15 Additional 
changes include the need for ten of sixteen core courses to be completed  
before the start of a prospective student-athlete’s senior year of high school, 
seven of which must be in English, math, and science; otherwise, automatic 
competition eligibility will be revoked.16 According to the NCAA, the  
intention is to ensure that prospective athletes are just as prepared for school as 
they are for their sport, and it suggests that the initial impact of the initiative 
will decrease with time as incoming students adjust.17 However, NCAA  
research shows that men’s basketball and football players will feel the most  
significant immediate impact.18 Had these new requirements gone into effect 
during the 2010–2011 academic year (just prior to its announcement), 41% of 
men’s basketball and 35% of football incoming players would have been 
deemed ineligible to compete.19 What is disconcerting is how this will likely 
disproportionately impact the African-American population of the incoming 
class in revenue sports. Of all Division I men’s basketball and football players, 
African-Americans make 60.9% and 46.8% of the populations, respectively.20 
However, this is not surprising to critics who point to a long-implied covert, and 
even overt, history of racism inherent in the development of HWCUs (also  
referred to as predominantly white institutions (PWIs)) and the NCAA’s  
handling of academic policies that largely concern its African-American  
athletes.  
                                               
still grant a scholarship but will bar the athlete from immediate athletic participation. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. NCAA DIVISION I INITIAL-ELIGIBILITY STANDARDS, SUPP. NO. 20, 4–5, 
http://www3.nd.edu/~ncaacomp/documents/IEExecutiveSummary.pdf (last visited June 9, 2016).  
Much has been written about how, with each new academic standard, a large percentage of  
student-athletes from previous years would have been deemed ineligible. The stated percentages are 
the predictions, based on available data, for the negative impact the new standards will have on the 
incoming 2016 class. 
20. Albert Y. Bimper Jr., Game Changers: The Role Athletic Identity and Racial Identity Play on 
Academic Performance, 55 J.C. STUDENT DEV. 795, 795 (2014). African-Americans make up the  
largest percentage of men’s basketball teams, and a large percentage of football teams, at some of the 
nation’s most prestigious universities, private and public, though they only make up single-digit  
percentages at most of these same institutions as a whole. 
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III. NCAA POLICIES: A TROUBLED HISTORY 
A. Exclusion and Overt Discrimination 
 Beginning in 1852, college athletics have been a vital part of the  
postsecondary education experience;21 however, so has racial discrimination 
and prejudice.22 Throughout the late 1800s and into the 1900s, legal  
segregation limited African-American participation at the most prominent  
colleges in the nation.23 Though a few were afforded playing opportunities at 
PWIs in the North, the Southern PWIs barred them from entry and  
participation.24 Statutes existed prohibiting athletic competition between black 
and white athletes, relegating African-Americans to playing in less formally  
organized settings.25 In some universities, even if African-Americans were  
admitted, the African-American students were still barred from athletic  
participation.26 In Northern schools, black athletes often had to sit out during 
games against Southern institutions.27 Additionally, many Northern  
institutions adopted quotas to limit the number of black athletes on a team, and 
                                               
21. See Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of Racism in College  
Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 623 (1995). College athletics predates the NCAA. See  
generally id. The organization was created as a unifying body that allowed voluntary membership. The 
first established and recorded intercollegiate competition was a crew match between Harvard and Yale. 
Id. at 623 n.33. 
22. See id. Racial discrimination in intercollegiate sport is interlinked with the discrimination  
African-Americans receive as part of America’s historical and social context, not independent.  See id.  
23. Id. at 624. The Jim Crow laws established the “separate but equal” regulations that segregated 
white and black interaction in almost all realms, including most academic institutions. 
24. See id. at 626. In general, African-Americans were prohibited from athletic participation at 
Catholic universities; they also could not participate in sports at schools that did not admit black  
students.  Id. 
25. See id. at 625–26. The University of Kansas limited African-Americans’ rights to most  
extracurricular activities, including the universities’ athletic teams, with the athletic director stating that 
no person of color would play on a team while he was in charge.  Id. at 626–27. 
26. See id. at 626. “[B]lacks were denied practically every right except that of attending classes.” 
Id. at 627 (quoting RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE NEW NEGRO ON CAMPUS: BLACK COLLEGE 
REBELLIONS OF THE 1920S 316 (1975)). 
27. Id. at 628.  
 
[M]ost northern teams with blacks on their rosters either did not schedule games 
against southern teams or would leave their African-American players at home when 
the team traveled south. It has also been suggested that a promise to withdraw  
voluntarily from games against southern schools was an element of the consideration 
that some northern institutions extracted from their black athletes.  
 
Id. 
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the only students allowed were expected to be “exceptionally talented.”28 Even 
if they were allowed to partake in athletic participation, racism still ran  
rampant.29 Sport participation was limited to track and field and similar sports 
that did not require “intimate physical contact” with white athletes.30 Many  
associate the social pariah status of the African-American college athlete with 
their academic neglect and underperformance: they were advised to take courses 
with little merit and focus on gaining and maintaining eligibility.31 
B. Covert Practices? Academic Policy Beginnings: Props 48 and 42 
College football and basketball were white men’s games from their  
beginnings until the 1970s.32 And during the early years, academic policies were 
light. “[I]n 1948 the NCAA instituted the ‘sanity code’” that ensured  
academic integrity as one of its components; it was quickly eliminated in 
1951.33 In 1959, the NCAA required twelve-credit semesters. As stated earlier, 
1965 saw the introduction of a 1.6 minimum GPA for continued eligibility.  
Prospective student-athletes required a high school GPA of 1.6 and an SAT or 
ACT score that predicted at least a 1.6 GPA as a college freshman.34 This  
policy remained in place for a decade. Until the 1970s, the NCAA did not  
undergo any additional academic reforms. During these early years, most sports, 
including men’s basketball and football, were dominated by white  
athletes. However, as the African-American presence in college athletics  
began to rise, there was a simultaneous decrease in academic standards and  
increase in academic exploitation.35 In 1972, the 1.6 rule was abolished  
leaving virtually no academic standards for incoming student-athletes, other 
                                               
28. Id. at 629–30. 
29. See generally id. 
30. Id. at 631–32. “These sports were viewed as not involving the type of intimate physical contact 
required by basketball and swimming.”  Id. at 632. 
31. See id. at 631–33. The isolation that African-Americans faced on college campuses caused not 
only emotional pain but frustration that manifested in poor academic performance; institutions  
focused on helping them maintain athletic eligibility at best.  Id. 
32. See Delgreco K. Wilson, Black Athletes, Race and the Rise of NCAA Eligibility Requirements, 
THE BLACK CAGER (Sept. 18, 2014), http://delgrecowilson.com/2014/09/18/black-athletes-race-and-
the-rise-of-ncaa-eligibility-requirements/. Because of Jim Crow segregation, most African-Americans 
only participated in athletics at historically black institutions that lacked the organization and esteem 
of their PWI counterparts. 
33. Phillip C. Blackman, The NCAA’s Academic Performance Program: Academic Reform or  
Academic Racism?, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 225, 230–31 (2008).  
34. Michael J. Mondello & Amy M. Abernethy, An Historical Overview of Student-Athlete  
Academic Eligibility and the Future Implications of Cureton v. NCAA, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
127, 128 (2000).  
35. See id. at 128–29. 
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than graduating from high school. A year later, the minimum initial eligibility 
GPA was raised to 2.0. During the same time period, in 1974, freshmen were 
granted eligibility to participate in the revenue-generating sports of men’s  
basketball and football. As the popularity of college athletics continued to rise 
with the addition of a new crop of players, the NCAA decided that a uniform 
academic system was needed to reflect the academic standards of its member 
institutions’ missions. The organization was determined to avoid the  
reputation of allowing its athletes to be seen as less than serious students.36 The 
NCAA wanted to place some of the academic burden on the institutions by 
mainstreaming athletics into the schools’ educational missions;  
administrators and faculty would have to share in the responsibility of  
upholding policies.37 Together with university officials, the NCAA set forth its 
first full-fledged reform for incoming freshmen academic guidelines.38  
However, the NCAA’s position was not widely accepted. 
 Some critics believed that the need for heightened standards was  
influenced by the influx of African-American athletes entering college  
athletics. As the 1970s continued, African-Americans moved towards  
becoming the majority in the revenue-producing sports of men’s basketball and 
football; by the 1980s, they were dominant.39 Whether the NCAA  
intended for its new standards to disproportionately affect African-Americans  
negatively is a constant source of contention. But, as accumulated knowledge 
and research made it clear that these policies would negatively impact  
African-American athletes, the organization moved forward with  
implementing requirements that threatened African-American sport  
participation and postsecondary enrollment while maintaining that no racial  
discrimination was intended.40  
 The problems began with Proposition 48, or Prop 48 for short.  
Implemented in 1986, Prop 48 required an incoming GPA of 2.0 and an SAT 
(reading and math) or ACT composite test score of 700 or 15, respectively, to 
avoid an automatic year of ineligibility.41 Additionally, the 2.0 GPA minimum 
                                               
36. Id. at 127. College athletics worked adamantly to avoid the “dumb jock” stereotype that was  
developing with the growing popularity of college sports and the number of academic concessions  
being made for the student-athletes. Id. 
37. Id. at 129. 
38. Id. at 130. Proposition 48 would see widespread backlash, especially from the  
African-American community. Id. at 133. 
39. See Wilson, supra note 32 (explaining dominant in the sense of making up the majority of the 
teams at most institutions while only being a disproportionately small percentage of the general  
student body). 
40. See id. The NCAA held steadfast to its claim that whether or not African-Americans would be 
harmed by its policies, any of these negatives were not intended by the new academic standards.  Id. 
41. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 131.  
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had to be the result of a cumulative average from eleven core courses in high 
school.42 The year prior to its introduction, between 40% and 60% of entering 
student-athletes in the average Division I-A men’s basketball and football  
programs scored less than 700 on the SAT.43 Consequently, over the next four 
years, there was a drop in African-American participation as they tried to  
adjust to the changes.44 Proponents argued that athletes would rise to the  
occasion to meet the new standards or have a year to acclimate to college while 
having more time to focus on problem courses.45 Opponents could not see  
beyond the obvious: the new test score standards had the largest effect on the 
black student-athletes, which eliminated a large percentage, 45%, of the  
eligibility pool that could have graduated under the old standards.46 The NCAA 
also had to face the criticism of the actual test makers. George  
Hanford, the then-president of the College Board, stated that it was  
indisputable that African-Americans performed worse on standardized tests  
because of a lack of educational privilege and that using the SAT as a  
minimum standard was racist and discriminatory.47 Additionally, the score  
cutoff violated SAT science; the test has a 50-point standard deviation,  
meaning that a 700 should be calculated the same as a score as low as 650.48 
Hanford concluded by stating that the only purpose of the SAT is to be a  
first-year college predictor and that the way the NCAA was using the  
                                               
42. Blackman, supra note 33, at 231. GPAs were calculated using core courses to try to create  
consistency nationwide; core course curriculums are much more standardized and can be monitored in 
ways that electives cannot be. 
43. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 131. 
44. Id. at 131–32. The percentage of African-American student-athletes who met the new  
qualifications was disproportionately less than their white counterparts. 
45. Id. at 132. The NCAA believed that African-American student-athletes would eventually adjust 
to the new standards and rates would normalize. 
46. See id. at 133. 
47. Id. at 134.  
 
It is an undisputed fact that minority candidates earn significantly lower scores on the  
average because many of them are less privileged educationally and  
socio-economically than whites. Proposition 48 will have a differentially severe  
impact on the aspiring athletes among blacks, but not because of bias in the SAT, but 
because of the educational deficit that exists in this country. So, it is [quite] obvious 
that the use of SATs to help set minimum academic standards for freshmen is patently 
discriminatory and racist in its effects. Its use is a disservice to minority athletes.  
 
HAROLD J. VANDERZWAAG, POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN SPORT MANAGEMENT 49 (2d ed. 1998);  
Accord Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 134. 
48. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 134. “A second problem with the use of the SAT  
minimum test score was that the use of this standard violated the scientific and philosophical  
principles upon which the SAT was based.” Id. 
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assessment contradicted its purpose; it is meant to be one factor in the college 
admissions process.49 More importantly, there was no empirical evidence for 
the 700 absolute cutoff score.50 
 The College Board was not the only vocal opponent. Two coaches shared 
their disdain for the new standards. Coach John Chaney of Temple University 
accused the NCAA of racism, stating that the new rules punished  
African-Americans.51 Coach John Thompson, Jr. of Georgetown University 
called for the NCAA to review the effects of its policy and change the rules.52 
During the same year, the organization began the revision process, but even with 
the direct evidence and accusations of the discriminatory practices that resulted 
from the implementation of Prop 48, the NCAA continued to raise its standards, 
asserting that its only mission was to combat the “dumb jock” stereotype.53  
In 1989, that revision became the short-lived Prop 42 and was  
controversial from the start. It was written and sponsored by the Southeastern 
Conference (SEC), the last major conference to open up its teams to black  
athletes, which vowed implementation with or without NCAA adoption.54 Prop 
42 created the partial qualifier: a student-athlete who met at least one of the 
eligibility benchmarks—the 2.0 core GPA, the test score requirements, or the 
completion of eleven core courses—could receive need-based, not  
athletically-based, financial aid.55 A non-qualifier could not receive any aid  
                                               
49. Id. at 134–35. 
50. Id. at 135.  
 
Critics of Proposition 48 cited evidence from a new study that showed there was no  
statistical or educational rationale for using standardized test scores as an absolute 
cutoff for eligibility. From the outset, advocates of African-American student-athletes 
have argued that the tests were culturally biased, while testing-company officials have 
insisted that their tests were never intended to serve as an absolute cutoff. Even many 
of the rule's supporters acknowledge that the decision to set the eligibility cutoff at 
700 was not based on empirical knowledge.  
 
Id.  
51. Wilson, supra note 32. 
52. Id. 
53. See Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 127, 135.  Prior to Prop 48, the single condition 
of needing to graduate from high school to be a college student-athlete did not help the negative  
stereotypes cast on college athletics.  Id. at 129. 
54. Wilson, supra note 32. 
55. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 135.  Accord Blackman, supra note 33, at 231–32.  
“[A] ‘partial qualifier’ . . . ‘may receive institutional financial aid that is not from an athletic source and 
is based on financial need only, consistent with institutional and conference regulations . . . during the 
first academic year . . . .’”  Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 135 (quoting 1995–96 NCAA 
DIVISION I MANUAL art. 14.3.2.1.1 (1995)). 
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during the first academic year.56 Ultimately, the NCAA reverted back to its  
revision process. Its next reform, Prop 16, was introduced for the 1996–1997 
academic year. Prop 16 would not only prove to be one of its most  
controversial provisions but would also result in a lawsuit that publicly had  
student-athletes accuse the organization of the racism that many believed it had 
been operating under for years. 
C. Implicit Racism? Prop 16 and Cureton v. NCAA 
 Prop 16 took Prop 48 and virtually raised all of its standard  
requirements. The initial eligibility GPA increased from a 2.0 to a 2.5, and the 
core course total increased from eleven to thirteen.57 It was also Division I’s 
first introduction to the sliding scale that was to “make the initial eligibility  
index more malleable.”58 The 2.5 GPA aligned with a 700 or 18 on the SAT or 
ACT, respectively. If the student’s GPA was below this, the standardized test 
score minimum adjusted accordingly. The lowest minimum GPA, a 2.0,  
required a 1010 on the SAT or ACT sum of 86 to preserve athletic  
eligibility.59 Meanwhile, with a 2.5 GPA, a student could compete with an 820 
SAT or 68 ACT sum.60 As the GPA increased, the test score decreased and vice 
versa.  
Partial qualifiers were still allowed under this proposition. “[A]n SAT score 
between 720 and 810 (ACT [sum] score between 59 and 67) and a core GPA 
that produces a GPA-test combination score comparable to that required of  
qualifiers” could grant a student athletic financial aid but bar athletic  
participation.61 As expected, Prop 16 closed college doors for many  
African-American student-athletes.62 The disproportion was obvious: while 
only 46.4% of black high school seniors met the requirements, 67% of white 
seniors were eligible. Now, with a number of direct incidents that markedly  
affected black student-athletes, a few students decided it was time to seek  
justice in court.  
 In 1997, four African-American student-athletes challenged the NCAA’s 
                                               
56. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 135. (“[A] student-athlete who achieved neither the 
GPA nor SAT/ACT benchmarks, ‘shall not be eligible for . . . institutional financial aid during the first 
academic year.’” Id. (quoting 1995–96 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 14.3.2.2.1 (1995)). 
57. Id. at 135–36. 
58. Blackman, supra note 33, at 233.  
59. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 136. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. See Blackman, supra note 33, at 233. “Despite this sliding scale, a study by The National Center 
for Education Statistics indicated that Prop. 16 significantly reduced opportunities for all  
student-athletes, particularly African-Americans.” Id. 
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minimum cutoff score with the primary question of whether 
Proposition 16 violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.63 The  
plaintiffs claimed that the use of a cutoff had “an unjustified, disparate impact 
on African-American student-athletes.”64 The district court found for the  
plaintiffs initially.65 There were three main components to address in the case: 
(a) if the NCAA was subject to Title VI regulations, (b) if minimum test scores 
created a disparate impact among minorities students, and (c) if Prop 16  
justified an educational necessity.66 In response to the first component, the court 
held that because the NCAA received federal funds, even if through  
indirect means, it was subject to Title VI regulation because those funds were 
used to sponsor a program.67 For the second part, the court held that even though 
there was some “beneficial impact” to Prop 16 (i.e., the increased graduation 
rates), that was not the argument here, and this benefit could not  
overcompensate for the disproportionately large, negative impact affecting the 
same group.68 The court concluded the case by responding to the third  
argument: closing the graduation gap between white and black students was a 
real educational concern, but this “back-end” benefit could not undo the  
underlying effects of Prop 16 and its attempts to use a “bottom-line” defense to 
justify its practices.69 This victory for the four student-athletes was  
short-lived, however, as it was reversed in December 1999 in Cureton II.70 The 
Third Circuit ruled that “section 601 of Title VI did not preclude  
recipients of federal funds from [discriminatory practices against] programs not 
                                               
63. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 139 (citing Cureton v. NCAA (Cureton I), 37 F. Supp. 
2d 687, 689 (E.D. Pa. 1999)).  
 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, “No person in the United States 
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation 
in, or be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964)  
(prohibiting discrimination on basis of race by any program or activity receiving  
Federal financial assistance). 
 
Id. at 139, n.89. 
64. Id. at 139–40 (citing Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 689). 
65. Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 715. 
66. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 139–45.  
67. Id. at 142; see also Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 694. 
68. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 144 (citing Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 700).  “The 
court, however, found the NCAA's argument unpersuasive, determining that a selection practice having 
a disproportionate ‘beneficial’ impact upon a specific group could compensate for any disproportionate  
adverse impact on that same group.”  Id. 
69. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 145 (citing Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 705).  
70. Cureton v. NCAA (Cureton II), 198 F.3d 107, 118 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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receiving the federal funding.”71 Although NCAA institutions receive  
federal funds, the NCAA itself does not, and the NCAA does not actually  
control its member institutions; members have the option to withdraw from the 
organization if they do not want to accept any sanctions or follow its  
policies.72  
Though defeated, Cureton I is still an important legal matter in that it 
opened the doors to athletes questioning the NCAA’s policies, especially the 
black athletes who seemed to face more institutional racism with every new 
NCAA policy.73 Coaches and athletes inquired into the creators of the rules. 
They accused the NCAA of using its policies to appease racist university  
administrators and supporters while pretending to be inclusive but actually  
reducing the black presence in college athletics, and college in general.74  
Opponents wondered whether rules were being created in a vacuum.75 Each  
reform harmed more and more of the economically and academically  
disadvantaged.76 The Black Coaches Association (BCA) derided the lack of  
African-American representation in the rule-making body, even though the 
rules would disproportionately affect athletes of color; the NCAA could not hide 
that its policies implicated the organization in racist practices.77 Proposals to 
eliminate standardized test scores were rejected, as were proposals to  
redefine partial qualifiers.78 In place of Prop 16, there was a call for using  
classroom performance—educators believe it is the best indicator, and  
standardized tests have shown to reduce African-American access to college. 
However, the NCAA defends its academic legislation, reiterating that the  
legislation is not about race but stronger educational values that  
African-Americans will eventually rise to.79 But does this simply shift blame 
from the NCAA to the athletes while the proportion of whites to blacks  
                                               
71. Mondello & Abernethy, supra note 34, at 147 (citing Cureton II, 198 F.3d at 115). 
72. Id. at 148.  
73. See generally id. at 148–50. 
74. See Wilson, supra note 32. 
75. Timothy Davis, African-American Student-Athletes: Marginalizing the NCAA Regulatory 
 Structure?, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 199, 203 (1996) (accusing the NCAA of adopting legislation that 
harmed economically disadvantaged and academically at-risk student-athletes and referring to reforms 
as “knee-jerk” reactions).  
76. See id. at 203–04. As a way to try to draw attention to their issues, the Black Coaches Association 
(BCA) threatened to organize a series of protests and boycotts, including coaches and players, in 1993; 
the threats never came to fruition after behind-the-scenes negotiations halted the actions, but the BCA  
succeeded in raising issues of racial inequality in intercollegiate athletics. Id.  
77. See generally id. at 204, 212–26. 
78. Id. at 208–09.  
79. See id. at 210–11.  
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continues to increase?80 The next major lawsuit against the organization set out 
to prove the NCAA was guilty of intentional discrimination.  
D. Intentional Discrimination: Pryor II and More Policy Changes  
 Pryor v. NCAA was significant for the changes it would bring to the 
NCAA’s academic policies, for once resulting in the loosening of the  
academic restrictions.81 For the first time, the organization faced charges of  
deliberate and purposeful racially discriminatory practices. Two  
African-American plaintiffs contended that Prop 16’s true goal was to “screen 
out” and reduce the number of possible athletic scholarships for black students, 
violating Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.82 The 
district court dismissed the case, holding that the plaintiffs could not be provided 
a remedy for their claim of “deliberate indifference” under Title VI and failed 
to adequately allege intentional discrimination under the section 1981 claim.83 
However, this holding was later reversed by the Third Circuit, which held that 
the plaintiffs had a sufficient claim for purposeful discrimination under Title VI 
and section 1981.84 This case set a new precedent with the circuit court’s  
affirmation sustaining the long-running argument that NCAA academic policies  
established a standard of institutional racism. Pryor II “reopened possibilities 
for plaintiffs to sue the NCAA for discrimination.”85 Following the court’s  
decision, the NCAA had no choice but to revise its policies once more, this time 
relaxing its standards to protect itself from continued racist accusations.  
 Kelly Pryor and Warren Spivey were two African-American athletes 
who each signed a National Letter of Intent to receive athletic scholarships at 
Division I institutions.86 However, both failed to meet the conditions of Prop 
16, rendering their athletic scholarships void, and in February 2000, filed a  
lawsuit against the NCAA for intentional discrimination.87 The plaintiffs  
                                               
80. See id. at 211–12. “[H]eightening eligibility requirements are viewed as an easy means of  
shifting educational responsibility from universities to student-athletes.” Id. at 212.  
81. See Pryor v. NCAA (Pryor II), 288 F.3d 548, 562 (3d Cir. 2002). 
82. See id. at 552; Pryor v. NCAA (Pryor I), 153 F. Supp. 2d 710, 711–12 (E.D. Pa. 2001); see also 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2016).  
83. Pryor I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 716–19; Anneliese Munczinski, Interception! The Courts Get  
Another Pass at the NCAA and the Intentional Discrimination of Proposition 16 in Pryor v. NCAA, 10 
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 389, 394 (2003). 
84. Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 562. 
85. Munczinski, supra note 83, at 391. “Although the court did not settle the dispute, the opinion 
does suggest that purposeful discrimination suits may succeed against the NCAA in the future.” Id. 
86. Id. at 392 (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 554–55). 
87. Id. at 392–93 (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 555). Kelly Pryor, while still in high school, signed a  
national letter of intent to play varsity soccer at San Jose State University; Warren Spivey signed to 
play football at the University of Connecticut.  Id. at 392. However, both had their athletic scholarships 
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stated that although the NCAA purported the goal of Prop 16 was to improve 
African-American graduation rates, Prop 16 actually increased  
African-American athletic ineligibility and decreased the number of  
scholarships they received.88 The plaintiffs stated that “the NCAA knew of and 
intended these effects.”89 Under Title VI and section 1981, the plaintiffs sought 
relief for purposeful discrimination and deliberate indifference.90 The court  
reviewed judicial guidelines to determine whether the NCAA’s policy qualified 
as intentional discrimination through a “facially neutral policy.”91 Unlike  
Cureton I, the plaintiffs could not claim discrimination based solely on a  
disproportionate, negative effect on a particular race; they had to prove  
intentional imposition of adverse effects on African-American  
student-athletes.92 Enough evidence existed to prove that the NCAA did  
explicitly consider race while creating and adopting Prop 16.93 “The NCAA  
explicitly stated that one of the major goals of Proposition 16 was to increase 
the graduation rates of the African-American [student-athletes],”94 and the 
plaintiffs provided evidence that the organization relied on research  
demonstrating that the increased academic standards of Prop 16 “would ‘screen 
out’ [a] number of African-American athletes who would [not] meet [this new] 
                                               
revoked pursuant to NCAA Prop 16 regulations.  See id. at 392–93. Pryor was granted partial qualifier 
status due to a learning disability allowing her to practice with the team but not compete. Id. at 393. 
Pryor initially sued under the American with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. Id. Spivey joined 
with her to bring suit for intentional discrimination under Title VI and § 1981. Id.  
88. Id. at 393 (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 552). “Pryor and Spivey admitted in their complaint that 
the purported goal of Proposition 16 was to improve graduation rates among black student-athletes. 
Yet, they asserted that Proposition 16 actually rendered an increased number of African-American  
athletes ineligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics and receive scholarships.” Id.  
89. Id. (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 552).  
90. Id. at 394 (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 557).  
91. Id. at 402. “[The] plaintiff[s] must show that the relevant decisionmaker . . . adopted the  
policy . . . ‘“because of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects’ [on a specific] group.” Pryor II, 
288 F.3d at 562 (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
92. Compare Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1999), with Munczinski, supra note 83, 
at 401–02.  Because of Cureton I, the “plaintiffs ha[d] to show that the discrimination was intended, 
and not a mere by-product . . . to sustain a claim under § 1981 or Title VI.”  Munczinski, supra note 
83, at 402.  “The mere awareness of the consequences of an otherwise neutral policy will not be  
sufficient to provide the basis for a Title VI and § 1981 suit.”  Id.  Pryor and Spivey would be entitled 
to relief if they could show that: (1) they belong to a racial minority group, (2) they are victims of an 
intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant, and (3) “discrimination concerning one or 
more of the activities enumerated in § 1981” occurred. Id. at 403. 
93. Munczinski, supra note 83, at 408 (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 564). To recover any remedy, 
the plaintiffs “had to prove that the NCAA adopted Proposition 16 intentionally to impose adverse 
effects upon African-American student-athletes.” Id. (referencing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 562). The Third 
Circuit believed there was enough evidence to show that “the NCAA expressly considered race when 
it adopted Proposition 16.”  Id. (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 564). 
94. Id. (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 564). 
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standard.”95 According to the district court, the NCAA adopted Prop 16 in spite 
of this negative impact on African-American athletes, not because of the  
potential positive.96 The appellate court inferred that the NCAA intended that 
Prop 16 would, at least in part, “reduce the number of African-Americans  
eligible for athletic scholarships.”97 Although the court did not officially state 
that all of the NCAA’s intentions were “sinister” in its decision-making, the 
policy purposely discriminated against a group, rendering it void until the 
NCAA could provide evidence to the contrary.98 By coming to this decision, 
the court held that the plaintiffs had a valid claim for purposeful discrimination; 
the second claim for deliberate indifference was unnecessary.99  
 The NCAA understood the ramifications of such a decision. Faced with 
a public that saw it lose a case charging it with intentional racial  
discrimination, Prop 16 would have to undergo major renovations to avoid  
further claims of discrimination. For the African-American athletic population, 
it was a victory. After years of speaking out about racist undertones, and even 
overt discriminatory practices, the Pryor II decision gave credence to their 
claims. The NCAA’s history of racial discrimination would have to change by 
force, unless it wanted to spend years and money fighting cases. Following the 
appellate court’s decision, the NCAA amended the sliding scale for initial  
eligibility to reflect numbers that were less restrictive and discriminatory.100 
Simultaneously, the NCAA had to contend with ensuring that it was putting 
education first. The most recent policy change prior to the upcoming 2016 2.3 
or Take a Knee policy came in 2003. This reform package purported to  
de-emphasize the importance of standardized tests. But, there would still be a 
sliding scale that weighed GPA and test scores, and the number of required core 
courses would see another increase.101 The NCAA and its ever-present  
balancing act, which now required explicit attention to whether its new  
practices could be deemed racially discriminatory, still seemed to always fall 
short of providing racial equality and opportunity.   
                                               
95. Id. (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 564).  
96. Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 564.  
97. Munczinksi, supra note 83, at 409 (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 564). 
98. Id. (citing Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 566). The court stated that “although it was difficult to imagine 
that the NCAA embraced sinister motives, a policy that purposefully discriminates on account of race 
is presumed void unless it survives strict scrutiny.” Id. The plaintiffs’ claim would remain until the 
NCAA could produce facts that show it did not intend race-based discrimination.  Id. (citing Pryor II, 
288 F.3d at 566). 
99. Pryor II, 288 F.3d at 564, 567; see also Munczinski, supra note 83, at 410.  
100.  Blackman, supra note 33, at 235.  “After Pryor II, the NCAA lowered the stringent academic  
requirements of Prop. 16 and amended the sliding scale initial eligibility index to be less restrictive and 
less discriminatory.”  Id.  
101.  Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC, supra note 9, at 1. 
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In 2003, eligibility standards were adapted from three alternative  
proposals to amend the standards existing at the time.102 The NCAA purported 
to have two goals with its adjustments: “maximize academic success and  
minimize adverse impact on low-income and minority student-athletes.”103 
Among the first changes were the increase in the number of core courses from 
thirteen to fourteen and the complete elimination of the partial qualifier  
provision.104 The biggest focus, test score cutoffs, was eliminated—an SAT 
score as low as 400, or a comparable ACT score, could still be enough to  
qualify if the student’s GPA was high enough.105 In 2008, the Division I core 
course requirement was increased once again from fourteen to sixteen.106  
As the NCAA always seems to remain dormant for so long, and with Pryor 
II over a decade behind, the organization began working on its next  
policy change that would take effect in 2016. Though not yet implemented, the 
newest policy, 2.3 or Take a Knee, is arguably the most academically intensive 
change the organization has ever created. And based on inferences from  
existing data and NCAA history, it will once again be hard to deny the  
disproportionately high and purposely adverse effects the new policy will have 
on African-American student-athletes. Though the focus in this policy has 
shifted from test scores to GPA, this increase, especially because it focuses on 
core courses, will likely result in the most widespread shift in the racial makeup 
of the revenue sports in decades. And if the revenue sports, especially  
basketball, which has a dominant African-American presence, undergo  
substantial whitewashing, the NCAA will be hard-pressed to escape the  
impending backlash and evidence that will support its continuation of  
institutionally racist practices. Though the upcoming changes were introduced 
in 2012, giving all students their full high school careers to prepare, data  
supports the conclusion that prospective African-American college freshmen 
athletes will still suffer the most. 
                                               
102. See id. at 6–8. 
103. Todd A. Petr & John J. McArdle, Academic Research and Reform: A History of the Empirical 
Basis for NCAA Academic Policy, 5 J. INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 27, 33–34 (2012).  
104. See Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC, supra note 9, at 1. 
105. Id. 
106. NCAA ELIGIBILITY CTR., NCAA FRESHMAN-ELIGIBILITY STANDARDS: QUICK REFERENCE 
SHEET 1 (May 7, 2008), http://www.itatennis.com/Assets/ita_assets/pdf/Junior+Play-
ers/NCAA_Eligibility_Center_Reference_Sheet.pdf. 
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IV. WHAT’S COMING AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE 
A. A Bleak Future for Black Male Revenue-Sport Student-Athletes 
 What does this mean for the group of student-athletes that will enter  
Division I institutions in the fall of 2016? Though the NCAA has claimed to 
work tirelessly over the years to undercut the racial undertones of its academic 
policies, what is likely to occur this fall is out of the NCAA’s hands. The new 
academic standard should statistically affect more incoming African-American 
males than any other population. By raising the minimum  
immediate-competition GPA to 2.3, almost half of African-American male  
student-athletes will struggle with eligibility. The National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES) tracked twenty years of academic progress by gender and 
race/ethnicity in its report, “The Nation’s Report Card.”107 The document covers 
the time period from 1990 to 2009, breaking down data by cumulative GPA and 
core course GPA.108 The NCAA is requiring a 2.3 cumulative GPA for core 
courses.  As an average, this assumes that about half of the population of interest 
would have a GPA below the mean. The 2.38 already straddles the line of  
eligibility, leading to the conclusion that African-Americans are at a higher risk 
of being deemed ineligible and disproportionately so. When the focus is placed 
on the two revenue-producing sports, it becomes much clearer that the new  
policy would disqualify black male football and basketball players at a much 
larger percentage than any other racial group. 
According to the NCAA’s research, 43.1% of men’s basketball players and 
35% of football players that enrolled as freshman in the fall of 2009 would have 
been ineligible to play if the new standards were in place.109  
Academically, not much has changed, as 2015 predictions state that 40% of the 
basketball players and 35% of the football players currently in high school are 
not going to be eligible under the new rules.110 Scholars researching this area 
have been careful to not implicate race, generalizing it by the entire sport. But 
                                               
107. See generally NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., U.S. DEP’T EDUC., THE NATION’S REPORT 
CARD: AMERICA’S HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES 22–42 (2009), http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreport-
card/pdf/studies/2011462.pdf. 
108.  See id. (categorizing by race/ethnicity, gender, and course variations, including core academic 
GPA, total cumulative GPA, and average GPA by course type). 
109. Dana O’Neil, Eligibility vs. Academic Preparedness, ESPN (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/8236949/ncaa-increases-minimum-eligibility-standards-
division-student-athletes. 
110. See NCAA Eligibility, ABOVE THE RIM RECRUITING, INC., http://abovetherimrecruit-
ing.com/ncaa-eligibility-guidelines/ (last visited June 9, 2016) (providing the most accurate information 
available for predictions about the impact the new standards will have on the incoming 2016 class of 
college student-athletes).  
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it is already general knowledge that African-American males make up a large 
percentage of both sports (45.8% in football and 60.9% in basketball).111 What 
is more difficult to find is the racial makeup of freshmen  
student-athletes. As a whole, this is not published; one would have to  
manually count the freshmen on each Division I roster. A smaller version of this 
approach was undertaken to further support the negative racial  
implications of this new policy. Arguably, the SEC is a powerhouse  
conference for football, housing fourteen institutions, while the Atlantic Coast 
Conference (ACC) is massively popular for basketball and made up of fifteen 
institutions. Focusing first on football and the SEC, a review of current rosters 
reveals that of the 416 freshmen, 271 of them are African-American, a  
staggering 65%. Additionally, many of these freshmen were eligible to play  
immediately, and did, as the popularity of the redshirt is declining in the SEC.112 
Half of the SEC teams redshirted less than ten of their freshmen  
during the 2013–2014 season, and these institutions have over twenty  
freshmen on their rosters.113 Experts believe more true freshmen are seeing  
playing time because of increases in scholarship limitations, players departing 
early for the NFL draft, and young talent.114 In 2013, less than half of the  
available freshmen redshirted, leaving 196 of the 348 eligible for play.  
Statistical analysis infers that the majority of the available pool were  
African-American. That could change dramatically.  
If the NCAA’s 2009 numbers hold steady, 35.2% of incoming football  
players will be academically ineligible to participate.115 Using the 2015 SEC 
football rosters as an example, 146 of the 416 freshmen would be unable to 
participate. As previously stated 65% of the 416 freshmen are  
African-American. Considered another way, for every twenty players, thirteen 
are African-American.  Following this data, 95 of the 146 ineligible  
student-athletes are African-American student-athletes.  This is further  
supported by the previous inference about African-American male GPAs.  
Football student-athletes already underperform their non-athlete peers,  
pushing African-Americans further down the eligibility list when you factor in 
their GPAs. What was once the vast majority of the incoming football  
                                               
111. Bimper, supra note 20. 
112. See Chase Goodbread, Redshirting in College Football Trending Downward, NFL (Aug. 25, 
2014), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000383458/article/redshirting-in-college-football-
trending-downward. 
113. Mike Herndon, Redshirting Diminishes as More Players Leave Early for NFL and Young  
Talents Want to Play, AL (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2014/08/redshirting_di-
minishes_as_more.html. 
114. See id. 
115. O’Neil, supra note 109. 
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population will drop to the minority because of a GPA increase that blatantly 
affects one group more than any other. The implied institutional racism is  
further supported by the effects the new policy will have on basketball in the 
ACC, which, similar to football, has 65% African-American freshmen  
representation at thirty-nine. Redshirting is rarely employed in college  
basketball; athletes come prepared to immediately contribute to the team.  
However, according to the NCAA, 43.1% of incoming student-athletes will 
have to delay their debuts. If this was applied to the class that matriculated most 
recently, twenty-six of the sixty freshmen would be disqualified from  
competition. Simple statistical analysis predicts that seventeen of those  
twenty-six freshmen would likely be African-American. Once again the  
population would see a shift. GPA restrictions favor the recruitment of white 
student-athletes to fill the void because it will be easier to find white athletes 
who will immediately qualify based on the predicted GPA data.  
Despite using only the data of two conferences, the implications are  
obvious: the new NCAA policy will disproportionately deplete the  
African-American presence in the college sports they currently dominate, which 
have been producing the most revenue. In the words of Sonny Vaccaro, “Ninety 
percent of the NCAA revenue is produced by 1 percent of the athletes. Go to 
the skill positions—the stars. Ninety percent (of the 1 percent) are [b]lack.”116 
Of the prospective student-athletes who face the reality that they will not meet 
NCAA requirements, the majority will be black. In trying to fulfill the NCAA’s 
new requirement, coaches will have a much easier time finding white males that 
meet the grade requirement, relegating African-Americans to a minority 
presence. It begs the question of whether this has been the plan for some time: 
let African-American athletes build the sport to a point where it could transcend 
their efforts, then gradually push them out. The NCAA is not new to charges of 
institutional racism, and with this policy, it will likely have to justify its actions, 
especially when the numbers support discriminatory changes.   
B. WHAT Can the NCAA Do to Attempt Redemption (Again)? 
The NCAA cannot deny the effects the new policy will have on  
African-American male athletes. Though the organization makes its academic 
data available publicly, researchers at the University of Pennsylvania support 
publishing data that delineates the information similar to the framework 
above.117 Separating athletic academic data by race, sex, sport, and division will 
                                               
116. Everett L. Glenn, The Shame of College Sports: Black Athletes Play. But Where’s the Payoff?, 
SACRAMENTO OBSERVER (Mar. 11, 2013), http://sacobserver.com/2013/03/the-shame-of-college-
sports/. 
117. See SHAUN R. HARPER ET AL., BLACK MALE STUDENT-ATHLETES AND RACIAL INEQUITIES 
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allow the NCAA to justify any claims it makes about the academic  
progress of the population that generates most of its annual revenue.118 These 
same researchers suggest a number of additional improvements, such as  
establishing “a commission on racial equity that routinely calls for and  
responds to” the data, disallowing the NCAA to persist in any behavior that can 
qualify as fostering racial inequality.119 Additionally, athletic programs in the 
five conferences that generate the most revenue should use some of their  
revenues to establish programming and interventions to improve racial  
equity.120 Finally, the researchers call for more accountability from the  
colleges and their administrations, faculty, and staff.121 The NCAA's academic 
policies tend to place all of the academic burdens on the population that is  
systematically at a disadvantage, partially due to the organization's own  
policies that discriminate against them. College leaders should want to see the 
categorized data for analysis and charge themselves with closing racial gaps 
observed in the reports.   
V. CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 
 In its recent history, the NCAA has continuously displayed some level 
of upheaval in establishing academic policies, particularly as they pertain to  
initial eligibility. In combating critics and holding steadfast to its mission of 
championing educational primacy, the organization has unfortunately  
ignored—or purposely neglected—the needs of its most significant  
participants, the black men on the basketball and football teams. These  
student-athletes have a dominant presence in each sport despite academic  
policies that work against their favor. Over the last three decades, it has  
become impossible to deny the institutional racist practices of the  
NCAA—arbitrary cutoff scores and academic requirements that run counter to 
the average academic achievement of black male athletes. Furthermore, much 
has been written about the not-so-coincidental alignment of more stringent  
academic standards with the influx of black college athletes. The NCAA is torn 
between its commercial interests and its policymakers, who are oblivious to 
their institutional racist policies. As the organization tries to toe the line, it  
typically ends up on the wrong side, shutting out a population that benefits 
greatly from the ability to use college athletics as a means to obtain access to 
                                               
IN NCAA DIVISION I COLLEGE SPORTS 16 (2013), https://www.gse.upenn.edu/equity/sites/gse.up-
enn.edu.equity/files/publications/Harper_Williams_and_Blackman_(2013).pdf. 
118. Id.  
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
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higher education.  
Systematic disadvantages have stifled the academic progression of black 
male athletes with their average GPAs always trailing behind their white male 
counterparts; the same applies to their test scores. Though this information has 
always been readily available, the NCAA still established policies that would 
reduce the eligibility pool for this population. After being called out by  
coaches, standardized test makers, and finally, the athletes themselves, in court, 
the NCAA was indirectly acknowledging its history of racial inequity by  
removing test score barriers and focusing on other academic requirements. The 
sliding scale is not a perfect science either, as data shows that  
African-American athletes average lower GPAs. This would require higher test 
scores, which they lag in as well. However, the sliding scale and  
minimum-score removal did appear to be a step in the right direction. But as 
2016 draws closer and frameworks are developed, it is hard to look at the  
racial shift that is likely to occur, at least for the first few years, in men’s  
basketball and football, and not apply the term “institutional racism.” No other 
population will be affected the same way. And if the NCAA learned anything 
from the Pryor II case, it is that it cannot purport to not know the potential  
positives of the policy and it cannot justify its negative effects. The incoming 
freshmen with immediate eligibility will be overwhelmingly white, and while 
the young black men try to fulfill the requirements to earn athletic competition 
time, the country will have time to adjust to basketball and football without as 
many black faces. If this image holds, will African-American males ever be able 
to regain their dominance? It appeared that as soon as black male athletes began 
pouring in, the policymakers have been working towards slowly, but  
systematically, pushing them back out. The 2016 policy has the best chance in 
decades of accomplishing this on a large scale.  
There is no guarantee that this will happen; however, history and current 
data suggest that it will. Furthermore, it will take a number of years to  
plateau—assuming it does or that another policy change is not implemented that 
further discriminates against African-American athletes. With such  
staggering evidence, the NCAA will be hard-pressed to convince anyone who 
takes issue with the racist implications of the policy that it was neither the 
NCAA’s intention nor something it could not predict; the data speaks for  
itself. It is likely that the organization will be forced to amend the policy  
sooner than planned or face the ramifications, possibly legal, of its newest  
attempt of academic reform.  
 
